The hard part was getting the srtp seamlessly integrated into our RTP stack. We had 3 brands of phones to test with while implementing and this was was the only way they all supported. There is clearly a feud on how to exchange keys out there and we will end up implementing each of them as they become popular. As a developer, I can only implement what I have to test with. Do you know any devices that support MIKEY to test against? There is a LGPL libmikey out there so it's a strong possibility we can implement it as long as we have a test bed and some indication that it will be widely accepted and desired by people. Anthony Minessale II FreeSWITCH http://www.freeswitch.org/ ClueCon http://www.cluecon.com/ AIM: anthm MSN:anthony_minessale@hotmail.com GTALK/JABBER/PAYPAL:anthony.minessale@gmail.com IRC: irc.freenode.net #freeswitch FreeSWITCH Developer Conference sip:888@conference.freeswitch.org iax:guest@conference.freeswitch.org/888 googletalk:conf+888@conference.freeswitch.org pstn:213-799-1400 ----- Original Message ---- From: Alois Komenda <alois.komenda@esk.fraunhofer.de> To: freeswitch-users@lists.freeswitch.org Sent: Friday, January 25, 2008 6:20:19 AM Subject: Re: [Freeswitch-users] MIKEY-Support How can you ever be sure TLS is really used end-to-end? Even if TLS is used "end-to-end" i.e. on every hop, every involved proxy can read your keys. So if you can trust all proxys that route your messages, SDES is secure. -- Alois Komenda Fraunhofer-Einrichtung für Systeme der Kommunikationstechnik ESK -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- Von: freeswitch-users-bounces@lists.freeswitch.org [mailto:freeswitch-users-bounces@lists.freeswitch.org] Im Auftrag von Brian West Gesendet: Freitag, 25. Januar 2008 12:09 An: freeswitch-users@lists.freeswitch.org Betreff: Re: [Freeswitch-users] MIKEY-Support How on earth is it not secure? The keys are exchanged over a secure TLS channel. That is secure. Read section 8.3 again. "Thus, IT IS REQUIRED that MIME secure multiparts, IPsec, TLS, or some other data security service be used to provide message authentication for the encapsulating protocol that carries the SDP messages having a crypto attribute (a=crypto)." It does however say in 8.3 "When the communication path of the SDP message is routed through intermediate systems that inspect parts of the SDP message, security protocols such as [IPsec] or TLS SHOULD NOT be used for encrypting and/ or authenticating the security description." This can clearly be seen don't trust it if TLS isn't used end to end for the sip signaling channel. SDES seems to be the most widely used method at this point as you pointed out. I feel the security afforded by using SDES + TLS is way more than you'll ever get elsewhere. We do accept patches. ;) /b On Jan 25, 2008, at 12:15 AM, Alois Komenda wrote:
I don't think SDES over TLS can be called secure. And according to RFC 4568 this combination should not be used. (Anyway this seems to be the mostly used configuration at the moment.)
Even if MIKEY is not a perfect soloution for the problem, it provides
end-to-end security for keying material.
Regards
-- Alois Komenda Fraunhofer-Einrichtung für Systeme der Kommunikationstechnik ESK
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