Author: brian Date: Tue Jan 27 12:01:17 2009 New Revision: 11509 Log: FSCORE-280 Modified: freeswitch/trunk/libs/srtp/crypto/cipher/aes_icm.c Modified: freeswitch/trunk/libs/srtp/crypto/cipher/aes_icm.c ============================================================================== --- freeswitch/trunk/libs/srtp/crypto/cipher/aes_icm.c (original) +++ freeswitch/trunk/libs/srtp/crypto/cipher/aes_icm.c Tue Jan 27 12:01:17 2009 @@ -98,15 +98,15 @@ uint8_t *pointer; int tmp; - debug_print(mod_aes_icm, - "allocating cipher with key length %d", key_len); + debug_print(mod_aes_icm, "allocating cipher with key length %d", key_len); - // Ismacryp, for example, uses 16 byte key + 8 byte - // salt so this function is called with key_len = 24. - // The check for key_len = 30 does not apply. Our usage - // of aes functions with key_len = values other than 30 - // has not broken anything. Don't know what would be the - // effect of skipping this check for srtp in general. + /* Ismacryp, for example, uses 16 byte key + 8 byte + salt so this function is called with key_len = 24. + The check for key_len = 30 does not apply. Our usage + of aes functions with key_len = values other than 30 + has not broken anything. Don't know what would be the + effect of skipping this check for srtp in general. + */ if (!forIsmacryp && key_len != 30) return err_status_bad_param; @@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ if (forIsmacryp) { uint32_t temp; - //alex's clock counter forward + /* alex's clock counter forward */ temp = ntohl(c->counter.v32[3]); c->counter.v32[3] = htonl(++temp); } else {