folks, i'm wondering if anyone here has actually managed to get SIP over TLS working from a symbian s60 phone to FreeSWITCH. i've been trying for some time with an e71 and while i've made some progress, progress != success. in fact, i've progressed to the point where the failure is known to not be specific to FreeSWITCH's implementation. however, having used the certificates generated by FreeSWITCH's gentls_cert script with openssh s_server's builtin simple web server while having my e71's browser connect to it, i can say that the failure mode is same (we send cert, e71 replies with "illegal parameter") whether we are running SIP or HTTP over SSL/TLS. as such, it could still be a result of the certs generated by the FS scripts. to eliminate one obvious potential cause, note that i have installed the FreeSWITCH CA cert on the e71 so it shouldn't be a self-signed cert problem. this leaves me thinking that the problem is either an openssl problem (there appear to have been some interoperability issues between SSL implementations as a result of e.g. padding SSL PDUs) or a limitation in the feature set of the symbian s60 TLS implementation, specifically limitations on the types of server certs it'll accept. before exhausting more energy trying to track this down, i was hoping that someone out there may have solved this problem or at least know exactly what the problem is i can stop banging my head against the wall. anyone? anyone? Bueller? thanks, eric
Without one for me to test with I can only guess. I have tested TLS on Polycom, Snom you might need to setup sslv3 instead of tls on your profile for doing secure SIP. What are you trying https against? /b On Sep 12, 2008, at 10:01 AM, R. Eric Bennett wrote:
folks,
i'm wondering if anyone here has actually managed to get SIP over TLS working from a symbian s60 phone to FreeSWITCH. i've been trying for some time with an e71 and while i've made some progress, progress != success.
in fact, i've progressed to the point where the failure is known to not be specific to FreeSWITCH's implementation. however, having used the certificates generated by FreeSWITCH's gentls_cert script with openssh s_server's builtin simple web server while having my e71's browser connect to it, i can say that the failure mode is same (we send cert, e71 replies with "illegal parameter") whether we are running SIP or HTTP over SSL/TLS. as such, it could still be a result of the certs generated by the FS scripts.
to eliminate one obvious potential cause, note that i have installed the FreeSWITCH CA cert on the e71 so it shouldn't be a self-signed cert problem. this leaves me thinking that the problem is either an openssl problem (there appear to have been some interoperability issues between SSL implementations as a result of e.g. padding SSL PDUs) or a limitation in the feature set of the symbian s60 TLS implementation, specifically limitations on the types of server certs it'll accept. before exhausting more energy trying to track this down, i was hoping that someone out there may have solved this problem or at least know exactly what the problem is i can stop banging my head against the wall.
anyone? anyone? Bueller?
thanks, eric
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Brian West sip:brian@freeswitch.org
Note that I was mostly just hoping to find someone who'd already had experience trying to do SIP over TLS with an s60 device, not asking you folks to do add developing that knowledge in order to have you do my debugging for me. That said, I did leave out a few things in the interest of note being too long-winded... First, I should point out that I'm doing this on vanilla Mac OS X 10.5.4, i.e. no fink or macports installed packages. Second, I'm using a "latest" tarball from an unknown date in late August (see prior post on AIM SIP for explanation of why). I'm 4k miles away from the machine with no remote access so I don't know the exact date of the tarball. Third, my configs work fine without TLS. So what I did was perform a gentls_cert and then: 1) configured FreeSWITCH for TLS, forced e71 to register. Didn't work, "illegal parameter" error returned to server by client. 2) configured FS with "sslv23", forced e71 to register. Didn't work, "illegal parameter" error. 3) ran "openssh s_server -accept ... -CApath ... -CAfile ... -www - tls1" using the CA and server cert created by gentls_cert, pointed e71 browser at s_server port. Didn't work, "illegal parameter" error. 4) ran "openssh s_server -accept ... -CApath ... -CAfile ... -www - ssl3", pointed e71 browser at s_server port. Didn't work, "illegal parameter" error. 5) gave up for the time being hoping i could find wisdom on freeswitch- users. If you are interested in having an s60 device with which to test, contact me directly via email. <param name="podium" value=" Frankly, as the disappointed purchaser of a UTStarcom WiSIP-something- or-other years ago and one who waited anxiously for someone to sell the hipi-2200 from Paragon Wireless (never could find one), it seems to me that the s60 phones with SIP represent the holy grail for which SIP-minded VoIP people have been searching, ironic since it's been hiding in plain sight as they say... Notably s60 SIP devices have real PIM and syncing functionality, a browser (for those of us that would want to do SIP because we're frequently at a remote site that requires web-page-based authentication), 802.1X support, all in cell phone... one of which you're likely to have/need anyway. "/> thanks, eric On Sep 12, 2008, at 11:14 AM, Brian West wrote:
Without one for me to test with I can only guess. I have tested TLS on Polycom, Snom you might need to setup sslv3 instead of tls on your profile for doing secure SIP. What are you trying https against?
/b
On Sep 12, 2008, at 10:01 AM, R. Eric Bennett wrote:
folks,
i'm wondering if anyone here has actually managed to get SIP over TLS working from a symbian s60 phone to FreeSWITCH. i've been trying for some time with an e71 and while i've made some progress, progress != success.
in fact, i've progressed to the point where the failure is known to not be specific to FreeSWITCH's implementation. however, having used the certificates generated by FreeSWITCH's gentls_cert script with openssh s_server's builtin simple web server while having my e71's browser connect to it, i can say that the failure mode is same (we send cert, e71 replies with "illegal parameter") whether we are running SIP or HTTP over SSL/TLS. as such, it could still be a result of the certs generated by the FS scripts.
to eliminate one obvious potential cause, note that i have installed the FreeSWITCH CA cert on the e71 so it shouldn't be a self-signed cert problem. this leaves me thinking that the problem is either an openssl problem (there appear to have been some interoperability issues between SSL implementations as a result of e.g. padding SSL PDUs) or a limitation in the feature set of the symbian s60 TLS implementation, specifically limitations on the types of server certs it'll accept. before exhausting more energy trying to track this down, i was hoping that someone out there may have solved this problem or at least know exactly what the problem is i can stop banging my head against the wall.
anyone? anyone? Bueller?
thanks, eric
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Brian West sip:brian@freeswitch.org
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Eric, I wasn't aware that the s60 did TLS yet nor was I aware that it does SRTP till very recently. I do know that the phone is very picky and thats the extent of my knowledge on that. Still not 100% sure on those facts. /b On Sep 12, 2008, at 1:17 PM, R. Eric Bennett wrote:
Note that I was mostly just hoping to find someone who'd already had experience trying to do SIP over TLS with an s60 device, not asking you folks to do add developing that knowledge in order to have you do my debugging for me.
That said, I did leave out a few things in the interest of note being too long-winded...
Brian West sip:brian@freeswitch.org
Concerning TLS and SRTP on S60 see http://mosh.nokia.com/common/download/4452B13D5F854A8DE040050A45306C1B/origi... But I a not sure whether they use SDES or Mikey for key exchange. Brian West schrieb:
Eric, I wasn't aware that the s60 did TLS yet nor was I aware that it does SRTP till very recently. I do know that the phone is very picky and thats the extent of my knowledge on that. Still not 100% sure on those facts.
/b
On Sep 12, 2008, at 1:17 PM, R. Eric Bennett wrote:
Note that I was mostly just hoping to find someone who'd already had experience trying to do SIP over TLS with an s60 device, not asking you folks to do add developing that knowledge in order to have you do my debugging for me.
That said, I did leave out a few things in the interest of note being too long-winded...
Brian West sip:brian@freeswitch.org
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Brian, Yes, I'd also like to point out that finding details on that pickiness is not the easiest task either. That's why I was hoping to find someone here with some personal experience. If not, back to the salt mines myself... Just for completeness I will point out that I'm primarily interested in SIP/TLS and not SRTP. I'm much more concerned about people sniffing authentication data and using it to access for-fee (e.g. my PSTN trunk) services (e.g. my PSTN trunk) than I am about them hearing what I'm talking about. But that's my particular situation... thanks, eric On Sep 12, 2008, at 2:28 PM, Brian West wrote:
Eric, I wasn't aware that the s60 did TLS yet nor was I aware that it does SRTP till very recently. I do know that the phone is very picky and thats the extent of my knowledge on that. Still not 100% sure on those facts.
/b
On Sep 12, 2008, at 1:17 PM, R. Eric Bennett wrote:
Note that I was mostly just hoping to find someone who'd already had experience trying to do SIP over TLS with an s60 device, not asking you folks to do add developing that knowledge in order to have you do my debugging for me.
That said, I did leave out a few things in the interest of note being too long-winded...
Brian West sip:brian@freeswitch.org
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They can't use your auth data if they happen to sniff it. Its hashed and impossible for someone to reuse or gain your auth data from it. /b On Sep 13, 2008, at 3:11 PM, R. Eric Bennett wrote:
Just for completeness I will point out that I'm primarily interested in SIP/TLS and not SRTP. I'm much more concerned about people sniffing authentication data and using it to access for-fee (e.g. my PSTN trunk) services (e.g. my PSTN trunk) than I am about them hearing what I'm talking about. But that's my particular situation...
thanks, eric
On Sep 13, 2008, at 1:20 PM, Brian West wrote:
They can't use your auth data if they happen to sniff it. Its hashed and impossible for someone to reuse or gain your auth data from it.
Impossible? This seems like a over statement. Marty
/b
On Sep 13, 2008, at 3:11 PM, R. Eric Bennett wrote:
Just for completeness I will point out that I'm primarily interested in SIP/TLS and not SRTP. I'm much more concerned about people sniffing authentication data and using it to access for-fee (e.g. my PSTN trunk) services (e.g. my PSTN trunk) than I am about them hearing what I'm talking about. But that's my particular situation...
thanks, eric
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Anything is possible but the way the authentication data is hashed together it wouldn't be possible for someone to gain access to your authentication data derived from the auth headers in the sip packets. If it were so simple then everyone would be able to crack their Vonage accounts. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digest_access_authentication /b On Sep 14, 2008, at 12:05 AM, Martin Joseph wrote:
Impossible? This seems like a over statement.
Marty
Brian West sip:brian@freeswitch.org
On Sep 13, 2008, at 10:36 PM, Brian West wrote:
Anything is possible but the way the authentication data is hashed together it wouldn't be possible for someone to gain access to your authentication data derived from the auth headers in the sip packets. If it were so simple then everyone would be able to crack their Vonage accounts.
I also agree that the exposure is quite limited, and that a successful compromise is unlikely.
Still it's not wise to use language like impossible when discussing security precautions. Thanks for the great software and all the help too, Marty PS thanks for the link.
PPS here's another: http://www.esecurityplanet.com/patches/article.php/3446071
/b
On Sep 14, 2008, at 12:05 AM, Martin Joseph wrote:
Impossible? This seems like a over statement.
Marty
Brian West sip:brian@freeswitch.org
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Its still not the same as an MD5 flaw or collision. The Digest auth is time sensitive and unless you have a very weak password the chances are almost zero for someone to crack it. Needless to say you should be concerned about the signaling and the media... So TLS/SRTP all the way if at all possible. /b On Sep 14, 2008, at 12:30 PM, Martin Joseph wrote:
Still it's not wise to use language like impossible when discussing security precautions.
Thanks for the great software and all the help too, Marty
PS thanks for the link.
PPS here's another: http://www.esecurityplanet.com/patches/article.php/3446071
Brian West sip:brian@freeswitch.org
Anything is possible but the way the authentication data is hashed together it wouldn't be possible for someone to gain access to your authentication data derived from the auth headers in the sip packets. If it were so simple then everyone would be able to crack their Vonage accounts.
I know you know this, but I thought it'd mention it anyways. The security of digest is related to the security of your password in the first place. You CAN mount a brute force attack on the digest packets. So if you're picking simple passwords, don't rely on digest to prevent things. Although, it's probably much more profitable for an attacker to attack the VoIP provider directly. Depending on their platform, this could be a lot easier than brute forcing even a simple password :). -Michael
On Sep 14, 2008, at 1:52 PM, Michael Giagnocavo wrote:
Anything is possible but the way the authentication data is hashed together it wouldn't be possible for someone to gain access to your authentication data derived from the auth headers in the sip packets. If it were so simple then everyone would be able to crack their Vonage accounts.
I know you know this, but I thought it'd mention it anyways. The security of digest is related to the security of your password in the first place. You CAN mount a brute force attack on the digest packets. So if you're picking simple passwords, don't rely on digest to prevent things.
Although, it's probably much more profitable for an attacker to attack the VoIP provider directly. Depending on their platform, this could be a lot easier than brute forcing even a simple password :).
The digest is of more than just the password, there are other elements to the hash's including the nonce, while in the "old days" these were pretty hard to brute force, with the current availability of rainbow tables, it shouldn't be that hard to reverse even non trivial passwords. Mike
Still with a password thats secure the probability is rather low. But if you're that concerned about the signaling you should be equally concerned about the media. As entering your credit card or account information over VoIP is just as bad and also travels in the RTP stream. Also don't use VBR codecs on SRTP links. /b On Sep 14, 2008, at 2:49 PM, Michael Jerris wrote:
The digest is of more than just the password, there are other elements to the hash's including the nonce, while in the "old days" these were pretty hard to brute force, with the current availability of rainbow tables, it shouldn't be that hard to reverse even non trivial passwords.
Mike
Brian West sip:brian@freeswitch.org
participants (6)
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Brian West
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Martin Joseph
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Michael Giagnocavo
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Michael Jerris
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Peter P GMX
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R. Eric Bennett