I don't know if it puts anything in the logs but the theory here is to prevent a potentially longer certificate chain validation.   In theory a connection could provide a certificate and then several above that that would get walked to try and validate to the depth specified (and if no matching signed cert is found at that point it would throw an error).  Generally having this variable set to the length of the max cert chain-1 should work but you can always set it to more than that without a negative effect.

Is your issue you think it should be failing and it isnt or?

~mitch (they, them)


On Thu, Aug 19, 2021 at 7:44 AM Victor Bogatyryev <victor.bogatyryev@gmail.com> wrote:

Hi!

I cannot understand how the directive <param name="tls-verify-depth" value="1" /> works.

The verification policy is set like this

<param name="tls-verify-policy" value="all|subjects_all" />.

The certificate chain has one intermediate CA. But I don't see anything in the tport log except for checking the subject of the user's certificate.


Regards.

--

V.Bogatyryev

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