[Freeswitch-users] ZRTP protocol measurement

[SERGE TUMBA]

Hi Jason,

 

Thank you so much for your suggestions. You adviced to do the measurement in whatever way I normally would, comparing ZRTP sessions with sessions that do not involve ZRTP, and seeing if there are performance differences that affect my usage scenario.

 

In other world, comparing the situation where I have zfone to secure end points and the situation where I have no zfone. I still want to know the tools (security tools or network tools or any others) to use and how to come up with performance differences.

 

Thank you!

 

Serge.
 


> Date: Thu, 1 Apr 2010 18:09:15 +1100
> From: jason at jasonjgw.net
> To: freeswitch-users at lists.freeswitch.org
> Subject: Re: [Freeswitch-users] ZRTP protocol measurement
> 
> SERGE TUMBA <serget68 at msn.com> wrote:
> > 
> > I would like to know how to measure the performence of the zrtp using
> > FreeSWITCH that connect two X-Lite softphones which use the zfone for
> > encrypting voice packets on both end phones.
> 
> What do you want to know? There are almost as many performance measurements as
> there are people doing the measuring. I would suggest measuring in whatever
> way you normally would, comparing ZRTP sessions with sessions that do not
> involve ZRTP, and seeing if there are performance differences that affect your
> usage scenario.
> > 
> > Also, can someone contrast and compare ZRTP to SRTP focusing on these two
> > protocol behaviors.
> 
> Have a look at http://www.zfone.com/ for a description of ZRTP. From an
> operational perspective, the main difference is that in configuring SRTP, you
> need to use TLS to secure the SIP signaling; otherwise, the cryptographic keys
> are transmitted in the clear, which completely eliminates the security.
> Setting up TLS securely requires a public-key infrastructure whereby each side
> verifies the identity of the other.
> 
> In ZRTP, the negotiation takes place entirely in the RTP stream; there are
> several protection mechanisms provided to prevent third-parties from
> masquerading as one of the end-points (namely, key finger-prints, displayed to
> the user as words that can be verified in the conversation, and
> the use of mathematically related keys in subsequent sessions between the same
> parties, but without diminishing security). No public-key infrastructure is
> needed, hence no X.509 certificates or TLS are required.
> 
> 
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